allowed no stage for democracy and has forfeited the promise of self-determination and sovereignty.
ORIGINS OF WAR
The region in southeastern Europe that became 20th century Yugoslavia has been the object of conquest, the expedient of sacrifice, and a battleground of cultures. The blood spilt on her soils has not been rewarded with enduring governments and boundaries. The Balkan peoples, tired of war and subjugation, have always sought ways to resolve their seemingly irreconcilable differences. Historical contradictions were overcome by populations blended with common linguistic origin and the absence of distinctions in anthropological race. But the people's desire for peace, achievable by the development of a common Balkan identity, never reached completion. Conquerors moved or harassed populations, drove them away or attracted them, mixed or divided them, but never integrated them.
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Balkan geography has a deep cultural impact. Extreme weather, terrain, and limiting arterial lines of communication isolate villages, cities, and regions. Culture is deeply linked to village traditions. In many cases these localized areas are socio-ethnically homogeneous, with deep historical family ties and tradition forming modern tribes. Lore, history, and historical pride fuel the talk around tables smattered with Turkish coffee, slivovitz, smoked meats, and pickled vegetables. Above all, family and Balkan hospitality dominate local values, followed closely by the pride of individual prowess. These small modern tribes share successes and failures, work together during harvests, secure lost flocks, and share the same tables. Wood stoves intermingle with radios, a village television, and a rare phone with infrequent reliability. These peoples love dark humor, a joke, and any excuse for a community gathering. At the same time there is a somber tone amongst all of the ethnicities. It is deeply sad, a collective feeling of loss, and a frustration over a bleak future that are almost always accompanied by a typical Balkan shrug. The prospect of peace is generally forfeit, especially among the young. In too many instances, hope is measured in immediate needs and future plans for moving to the West or to the culturally secure centers --Belgrade, Zagreb, or Sarajevo. The preferred social interaction for young and old is deliberating or gossiping over coffee for extended hours. For the Serbs and Croats, religion is also a centerpiece of culture where the local priest serves as a trusted leader in village life. These priests are generally not apolitical; the consuming nature of Balkan politics requires them to tend to some politics as they tend their flocks. After so many despotic rulers, word of mouth from a trusted friend or local leader is the primary and only accepted form of information. It is in this environment that leaders in faraway places take on either a heroic charm or villainous personage, a determination that is made based upon ethnicity, family, and lore.
Superficially, it is easy to accentuate ethnic differences, especially in the more populated areas. City residents perpetuate village heritage and maintain cultural links to the mountains.
The village tradition of extended family also exists in the cities. In the same town, urbanethnicities maintain separate radio stations, newspapers, schools, and leaders. They perform their own cultural dances, enforce language distinctions, and approach school, family, law, and economics differently. It is not uncommon to view a Mosque, Catholic, and Orthodox churches all within the same field of view. Within the cities, churches serve as cultural centers that seemingly are mini "fault-lines." Instead, these demarcations reflect a culture based upon village identities and serve as witness to centuries of accommodation. Limited resources cause the practical sharing of cultural traditions and skills. This sharing is not limited to the confines of city life. Interspersed villages, although ethnically homogenous, also trade and socialize with neighboring villages. These commonalities of survival and history have always outweighed the distinctions exploited by nationalist politics. Ethnic generalizations and skills are perpetuated, and not all in a negative sense, with commonly expressed opinions like "Albanians are the best bakers," "Croats are the best craftsmen," "Serbs are the best fighters." In the larger cities, these distinctions become more blurred, especially among the young people. But the realties of a culture caped in inequities, cause attribution of blame. Here judgment is passed on ethnicity and on political leaders. These politicians are selected by ethnic vote, a phenomenon that is based on ethno-nationalist fear and lack of democratic experience. It is only in the realm of politics that the fault-lines are clearly evident.
The gradual blurring of ethnicity is severed by military service, marriage, ethnic business practice, national politics, and a nationally charged educational system. Each nationality has undertaken revisionist academics to produce ethnically distinct histories and curriculums.
Students attend ethnically homogenous colleges with incompatible curriculums --the Serbs to
Belgrade, the Croats to Zagreb and the Bosniacs to Tuzla or Sarajevo. These colleges also sever the moderating logic of a village lifestyle that lends itself to practical accommodation.
These students are exposed to the fervor of politics that is founded in exaggerated ethnonationalist differences. The outcome is not colleges that become production lines of fervent nationalists. Instead, the experience is too contradictory and leaves students disillusioned in an environment where promise is clouded by uncompromising nationalism. The youthful dream of normalcy is dispelled by curriculums that wield history as a nationalist weapon. Almost all believe that life was better before the break-up of Yugoslavia and death of Tito, and most see no future in their country. Instead of education becoming a means to better their country, it is seen as a means to escape.
The Balkan cultural differences were not enough to start a war. That took leaders, both external and internal, motivated by interests. Wars in the Balkans have never been people's wars. Balkan wars were fought over parochial interests and were not an inevitable clash of civilizations. People from different civilizations have met and merged in the Balkans. The apparatus of civilizations, states, and empires, has fought over Balkan labor, oil, and geography.
Popular idea did not cause its wars --Balkan kitchen fires are stoked with talks of politics, but these are shrugged off at the end of the night when the last log is burnt. Foreign armies won and lost the Balkan chattels, and the Balkan peoples of all nationalities fought against them in battles of defense and survival. The citizens of the Balkan "civilization" did not fight themselves until they were turned against each other by fear.
Balkan opportunists formed nationalist citadels of power from fear. This fear is rooted in village culture, based upon distrusts of things beyond community control, difference, and lore.
When the opportunity for self-determination was presented, the Balkans contested again, but this time from within. Nationalism pitted fear against fear, in a political environment that made villages and urban ethnicities feel vulnerable. Locals adopted the Balkan method of survival and consolidated. This condition still exists. Events at national, city, or local level are measured from a village perspective. An angry dispute, even the loss of one head of stock, a house fire, the murder or arrest of a solitary man have a major threatening impact on village life. This mentality dominates Balkan people who all have their roots in the villages. Because cities are linked to villages through extended families, city calamities send shock waves throughout the country. The only acceptable explanations are offered by local, trusted leaders. This fear creates a sense of isolation, supported by an accommodating geography. The Balkan answer to alleviate this fear is a village response; join together to face a threat. These collectives are then joined by the politicized Balkan nationalisms.
The major commonality among the South Slav peoples is a history of subjection and violent oppression. Although each people, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, had historically separate identities, they have been conquered and subjugated by so many conquerors that their identities were blurred through forced integration under imperialist yoke, local historical myths, and practicality.
"The Croats and Serbs as separate nations have a history whose beginnings are lost in the depths of time. Their national identities are rooted in the memories and traditions of their medieval kingdoms. Despite the fact that they are old nations, neither their national identities nor the states that they created were continuous. Ethnically and linguistically the people were not separate, so differentiations rested primarily on historical memory, traditions, and religion. One could almost say that Croats and Serbs are ethnically almost homogeneous from the standpoint of national consciousness and loyalties." This line became the front for wars and ethnic conflict. The complexity of this turbulent and contested line between empires was felt most by the locals who struggled for survival.
Resistance had its own lessons; local freedom fighters were met with barbaric vengeance.
When empires were strong, accommodation and assimilation became the Balkan practice of survival; when they were weak, resistance. Balkan local leaders developed a keen sense of opportunism, motivated by survival and fear. In a land where choosing the wrong religion meant impalement on a pike, the difficult of allegiance carried with it the consequence of life, land and family.
In Groups of these families elected representatives to the district or "knezina" that in turn elected the "knez" or chieftain. These chieftains then interacted with the Ottoman landlords and rulers.
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This system was entirely ethno-nationalist in character. Extended families became the "basis of were not eager to join this compact, but when they learned of a secret treaty in London, which was to grant Slavic lands to Italy for Italy's support for the allies, the Croats and Slovenes realized that they must join the proposed union or suffer their independence. Pavelic's regime applied this formula towards the Serbs: "One-third we will kill, one-third will be driven out of Croatia, and one-third we will convert to Catholicism." Estimates vary about the effectiveness of Pavelic's formula, but a generally accepted figure is 500,000 to 700,000 Serbs killed, 50,000 Jews, and 20,000 Gypsies. 
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Additionally, the Partisans developed "an almost universal disregard" "for the accepted customs and usages of war. Hospitals, ambulance convoys, and hospital trains, lacking any protection but the small arms carried by officers and enlisted orderlies, were easy targets to attack and were particularly inviting targets since the guerrillas suffered from a chronic shortage of medical supplies. The sick and wounded would be slain in their beds, the medical stores looted, and on occasion captured doctors and other medical personnel would be carried along and forced to care for sick and wounded guerrillas." 35 This legacy would prove to be most unfortunate.
Tito and the Partisans formed the Second Yugoslavia. Tito assuaged Italy and Britain by promising to protect individual rights and establish a coalition government with a provisional parliament. But these promises were swiftly cast aside. Tito introduced a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and began a reign of terror that eliminated all opposition. His staged elections were Soviet-style elections with only one party, the Communist Party. 36 Tito's formula for Yugoslavia was to eliminate the divisions within the republic. His tactic "was to throw the hatred into history's deep freeze by enforcing communal life on the three communities using repression, and if necessary, violence. Tito's tactic was flawed because when the resentments were taken out of the historical deep freeze, the memory of hatred proved to be as fresh as ever after it thawed." 37 Essentially, Tito suppressed all national political rights to the ideal of a new nation and its Communist ideals. He described the new government as a republic based upon federal principles. The newly formed Constitution in January 1946 was based on four equalities:
First, all Yugoslav citizens had equal rights and duties, regardless of race, nationality, or religion. Second, the six republics of the new Yugoslavia--Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia--were proclaimed to be equal in all aspects of their rights and duties. Third, the primary nations of Yugoslavia were defined to be equal. There were five of these: Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes. Fourth, all nations contributed equally to the formation and liberation of Yugoslavia.
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Tito's new constitution effectively linked national recognition with territory, an act which reaffirmed Balkan nationalism and left the remaining nationalities categorized as minorities.
Tito reformed federal structures by extending self-management to the republics and the two newly proclaimed autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojdvodina. These reforms were based upon Tito's flawed theory that if socialism served to unite nations, then Yugoslavian self-management socialism would serve to unite the nations of Yugoslavia. This ideological (and optimistic) theory was regarded as a final solution to the nationalist issue in the republics.
Economics eroded this ideal. In the late 1960's growing economic disparities among the ethnically segregated republics moved the country back towards nationalist antagonism and increasing demands for independence. Economics pitted the primarily Muslim urbanites against the agrarian based Serbs and Croats.
Yugoslavia began its slow disintegration once again. The party had "put into practice a policy which aimed at balancing out the nationalities--to a certain extent against each other. Albanians and all who live in Kosovo." 59 The bombing "message" that NATO wanted to send was that NATO was serious this time and sought to force Milosevic to sign the agreement. Macedonia. 69 The premise of the NATO-supported disarmament is that the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) lay down its weapons and receive amnesty in exchange for greater political and social rights for the Albanian minority in Macedonia.
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US STRATEGIC LESSONS
The US failed intervention in the Balkans reinforces the strategic verity of strategic The US military's asymmetric advantage forced termination but not resolution in the Balkans. The threat to stability is now twofold. The first is from the dissatisfied entities, who must now find an asymmetric response to achieve or exhaust their core aims. The second threat is global, where disaffected minorities have now validated a method to achieve recognition, legitimacy and the right to bid for self-determination. Rather than following a model for democratic transformation, the minority rights model has become one where minority violence is more powerful than minority vote to achieve internationally enforced gain.
Legitimizing self-determination initiatives is inherently destabilizing. This has greater regional instability potential than did the local conflicts in isolation. In example, the Macedonian NLA and
Kosovar KLA are locally recognized as the same UCK entity, a condition that allows the and American power, rationally pursuing national interests, would allow development of strategic priorities that synchronize the elements of power.
Redefining humanitarian interests as national interests is fraught with risk. The suggestion that the solution is to meld "strategic, economic, and humanitarian interests into an effective foreign policy" merits discussion. 78 Absent a grand strategy, intervention that is based upon one element of strategy without a defined long term interest or end-state, ultimately leads
the US into open-ended or irresolvable conflicts. "A human rights policy is not in itself a foreign policy; it is an important part of a foreign policy." 79 If humanitarian interests drive strategy, then the role of a national security strategy is negated.
Some conflicts lack a contemporary solution. They are in essence unsolvable until aggravating conditions are changed. Israel, the Balkans, Somalia, and Haiti all serve as example. Premature intervention may even worsen the cost of the conflict, allowing a strategic pause for the competing entities or arresting the development of a country. Intervention that either maintains a status quo or a return to the conditions that existed prior to the onset of hostility has a predictable violent outcome. "Since no side is threatened by defeat and loss, none has a sufficient incentive to negotiate a lasting settlement; because no path to peace is even visible, the dominant priority is to prepare for future war rather than to reconstruct devastated economies and ravaged societies." 80 An intervention that lacks the vision of a grand strategy may result in a stagnated condition of perpetual war. Intervention that disallows belligerents the privilege of executing the campaign by military means, simply means that they can transfer outward energy in the campaign to the political, economic, or informational spheres. But it is still war. A war of "endemic conflicts that never end because the transformative effects of both decisive victory and exhaustion are blocked by outside intervention. Unlike the ancient problem of war, however, the compounding of its evils by disinterested interventions is a new malpractice that should be curtailed--war's paradoxical logic and commitment to let it serve its sole useful function: to bring peace." Under the banner of human rights, the US, UN, and NATO opted to deny the Former Republic of Yugoslavia the sovereignty to shape its own political destiny. In Kosovo, the international community chose conflict termination at the expense of developing a lasting resolution for the Balkans as a whole. With no solution, the conflict continues in an environment where determination by force seems to be the only logic. The implications of opting for peacemaking and enforcement rather than that of setting the conditions for internal transformation are precursors for future legitimacy crises, unsuitable government structures, and a citizenry fragmented along the lines of hatred associated with ethnocentrist-nationalism. "Selfdetermination, in fact, was given more attention than long-term survivability," leaving the fate of questionable and dependent future structures in the region predictably unstable. 82 States that recognize challenged or failing states win an undesirable responsibility. The must maintain international welfare states to achieve the same stability that the status quo previously afforded.
This is a new form of welfare imperialism.
Unfortunately, there are no obvious patterns or consistency in the application of rules and criteria established by the international community for conflict resolution, especially concerning the fundamental question of legitimacy. The rules for democracy must be universally applicable. "If you are to have a democracy, it must be based on the rule of law, not people. The conflicting goals of integration and popular sovereignty conflict at this juncture.
Democracy involves a constant validation and questioning of sovereignty. If the results of this validation process are negative, then a popular transformation must occur, or else a legitimacy crisis develops. This process was not resolved in Yugoslavia. In the Bosnian instance, the international community applied pressure to conduct a premature referendum on selfdetermination. In Kosovo, the community granted unearned legitimacy to the KLA, subjugating the interests of the internationally recognized government. At no point, discounting international coercion and pressure, did it appear that the people of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia legitimized the ethno-nationalist groups that vied for power within the region. The bids for selfdetermination and recognition did not provide a popular legitimate alternative to the existing structure precisely because of the unresolved problems of borders, nationalism, and historic grievances. The new states did in fact protect different groups, but not all groups, suggesting that the proposals were still immature. International recognition provided some form of external legitimacy to the collectives, but certainly not internal legitimacy. Rather than averting war, the international community ignited a war in which the newly created minorities were forced to fight a new structure to redress their still unresolved grievances. This outcome was certainly predictable.
The lessons for the international community are many. First, no nation is willing to cede its sovereignty in favor of international dictates. Military force should be used to protect sovereignty; i.e., it should be applied to contain legitimate internal conflicts from spreading in the form of irredentist movements or to prevent external response or interference. Second, the citizenries who ultimately grant that sovereignty must achieve solutions concerning sovereignty.
Third, recognition must be understood for its importance and the responsibilities that it incurs.
One principle, either self-determination or sovereignty, must be accorded dominance over the other.
The current environment that allows open-ended qualifications for sovereignty is destabilizing. Too many self-proclaimed groups can pursue too many detrimental options under the current parameters. The international community cannot maintain parameters that allow the break-up of legitimate states or impede the natural internal conflict created by democratic transformation without providing adequate alternatives. "The breakup of one system without its replacement by another invariably generates indecision and possibilities for uncritical extremism." 85 The experience of the American Civil War, civil rights movements, Vietnam protests, and even the Los Angeles riots demonstrate that democracy is always contested and rarely sterile.
The international community must recognize that the subtle victories obtained through means other than war are more resilient, stabilizing, and consistent. Civil war is often a necessary evil of democratic maturation and must be allowed definition with the other-than-war category. Externally, intervention, in whatever form, must be treated as it is perceived internally, as war. Once the military element is introduced to conflict, neutrality and objectivity are sacrificed until the designated opponent is rendered ineffective. Victory in war is only accomplished by one side imposing its will on the other side. This is not a democratic concept.
It does not reduce the will to survive or mitigate the primordial desire for revenge.
CONCLUSION
The tragedy of Yugoslavia continues unresolved. Bloodshed was probably inevitable due to the unresolved grievances and structural shortcomings of the Tito legacy. It certainly could have been contained, maintaining the potential for a stable end-state, once the people grew tired of the conflict and recognized the value of accommodation over civil war and prosperity over ruin. Yugoslavia has never been left to determine its own destiny and at some point must resolve its unanswered grievances.
Wars are fought primarily over interests, ideas, or insanity. These wars can be resolved only when interests are either satisfied or recognizably forfeit, the validity of ideas proven valid or invalid; or, and most demanding, insanity is exhausted and surrenders to logic. Generally were not proven to the people, the war had not been fought to that point of exhaustion.
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